The	Unity	of	Evidence	and	Coherence Draft	chapter	for	Epistemic	Dilemmas, Edited	by	Nick	Hughes	(Oxford	University	Press,	Forthcoming). An	emerging	theme	in	normative	theory,	including	both	ethics	and	epistemology, is that there is an important distinction to be drawn between substantive and structural	requirements	of	rationality	(Scanlon	2007;	Worsnip	2018a).	The	goal	of this chapter is to examine this distinction as it applies within the epistemic domain.	What	is	the	relationship	between	substantive	and	structural	requirements of	epistemic	rationality? Substantive	rationality	is	a	matter	of	responding	to	reasons.	Scanlon	defines a reason for something as "a consideration that counts in favor of it" (1998: 17). Given	the	flexibility	of	the	English	word	'reason',	however,	there	is	no	single	sense in	which	reasons	count in favor	of	belief	or	action	(Schroeder	2008).	For	current purposes, a reason to	φ counts in favor of	φ-ing in the sense that it contributes towards making it substantively rational to φ. According to evidentialism in epistemology, all reasons for belief are constituted by evidence. Given this assumption, substantive rationality in the epistemic domain is a matter of proportioning	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence. Structural rationality, in contrast, is a	matter of having beliefs and other attitudes that cohere or "fit together" in the right way. Although there is some controversy	about	which	forms	of	coherence	are	required	for	structural	rationality, the following requirements are widely endorsed. First, your beliefs should be logically coherent in	the	sense	that	they	are	logically	consistent	and	closed	under logical consequence. Second, your degrees of belief or "credences" should be probabilistically coherent in the sense that they conform to the axioms of the probability	calculus.	And	third,	your	beliefs	should	be	meta-coherent	in	the	sense that your object-level beliefs cohere with your meta-level beliefs about which beliefs	you	should	hold. It is plausible that both substantive and structural requirements are built into our ordinary conception of epistemic rationality. An epistemically rational agent is one	whose beliefs are both coherent and proportioned to her evidence. Anyone	whose	beliefs are either incoherent or unsupported	by	her evidence	has thereby	violated	some	requirement	of	epistemic	rationality. Some theories	of epistemic rationality impose	no substantive requirement to respect your evidence,	but these theories	have little to recommend them.	On pure	versions	of	coherentism,	for	example,	epistemic	rationality	is	simply	a	matter of having beliefs that cohere with each other. Similarly, according to subjective Bayesianism,	there	is	nothing	more	to	epistemic	rationality	than	having	credences that are probabilistically coherent and updated by Bayesian conditionalization. These	views	are	subject	to	compelling	counterexamples.	Consider	Magic	Feldman, who combines Magic Johnson's beliefs with Richard Feldman's experiences 2 (Feldman	2003:	68).	Although	his	beliefs	are	coherent, they	are	not	epistemically rational.	Epistemic	rationality	requires	that	your	beliefs	cohere	not	only	with	each other,	but	also	with	the	evidence	provided	by	your	sensory	experience. Other theories of epistemic rationality abandon any structural requirements	of	coherence.	On	a	global	version	of	phenomenal	conservatism,	for example,	epistemic	rationality	is	simply	a	matter	of	believing	whatever	seems	true (Huemer 2001). Since there are no structural constraints on which propositions can	seem	true,	this	view	implies	that	epistemically	rational	agents	can	hold	beliefs that	are	wildly	incoherent	(Smithies	2019:	Ch.	12).	Arguably,	this	compromises	the value	of	epistemic	rationality	by	failing	to	preserve	the	structural	features	that	are distinctive of epistemically rationally agents. Any conception of epistemic rationality that deserves the name must recognize at least some structural requirements	of	coherence. This chapter begins from the plausible assumption that epistemic rationality	requires	both	coherence	and	respecting	your	evidence.	The	main	goal	of the chapter is to examine the relationship between these requirements.	What is the	relationship	between	the	substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence	and the	structural	requirement	to	be	coherent? Let's	define	bifurcationism	as	the	thesis	that	the	substantive	and	structural requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	are	distinct	and	sui	generis	in	the	sense	that neither	can	be	explained	as	a	consequence	of	the	other.	On	this	view,	there	are	two fundamentally	different	kinds	of	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality,	neither	of which	can	be	reduced	to	the	other.	One	argument	for	bifurcationism	is	that	these requirements can come into conflict when your evidence supports incoherent beliefs. Thus, Alex Worsnip (2018a) argues that your evidence supports metaincoherent beliefs when it is misleading about itself. Such cases threaten to generate epistemic dilemmas in which you are guaranteed to violate either the substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence	or	the	structural	requirement	of meta-coherence. The	central thesis	of this	chapter is that there	can	be	no	conflict	between evidence and coherence. This is because there are structural constraints on the evidential support relation, which guarantee that your evidence never supports incoherent	beliefs.	Any	epistemically rational	agent	who respects	her	evidence is thereby guaranteed to	be coherent, since the evidence always supports coherent beliefs.	According	to	this	version	of	unificationism,	there	is	fundamentally	just	one requirement of epistemic rationality, which incorporates both substantive and structural dimensions. This is the evidentialist requirement to hold beliefs that cohere	with substantive facts about your evidence in accordance	with structural facts	about	the	evidential	support	relation. The	challenge	remains	to	explain	where	Worsnip's	argument	goes	wrong.	I argue	that	your	evidence	cannot	be	misleading	about	itself	because	the	facts	about what	your	evidence	is	and	what	it	supports	are	always	self-evident	in	the	sense	that they are certain given your evidence. On this view, respecting your evidence guarantees that your beliefs are not only coherent, but also meta-coherent. 3 Moreover, I	explain	away intuitions to the	contrary	by	appealing to	a	distinction between	ideal	and	non-ideal	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality. Here is the plan. §1 presents a puzzle that arises from the bifurcationist assumption that there can be conflicts between evidence and coherence. §2 critiques various bifurcationist solutions to the puzzle, while §3 raises more general	problems	with	the	bifurcationist	assumption	that	generates	the	puzzle in the first place. §4 presents my unificationist solution to the puzzle, while §5 defends it by explaining away the intuitions that seem to favor bifurcationism. Finally,	§6	concludes	by	explaining	how	my	unificationist	solution	avoids	positing epistemic	dilemmas. 1. A	Puzzle	about	Evidence	and	Coherence This	section	presents	a	puzzle	that	arises	from	the	bifurcationist	assumption	that there	can	be	conflicts	between	evidence	and	coherence.	The	puzzle	is	generated	by cases in	which the substantive requirement to respect your evidence appears to conflict with the structural requirement to be coherent because your evidence supports incoherent beliefs. Such cases threaten to yield epistemic dilemmas in which	epistemic rationality issues logically inconsistent requirements,	but this is hard to stomach. Is it really tolerable to suppose that epistemic rationality sometimes	requires	us	to	do	what	is	logically	impossible? The	puzzle	can	be	presented	in	the	form	of	a	paradox: (1) Your	evidence	sometimes	supports	only	incoherent	beliefs. (2) Epistemic	rationality	always	requires	that	your	beliefs	are	supported	by	your evidence. (3) Epistemic	rationality	always	requires	that	your	beliefs	are	coherent. (4) Epistemic	rationality	never	issues	inconsistent	requirements. Each	of	these	four	claims	is	individually	plausible	but	they	are	jointly	inconsistent. If	your	evidence	supports	only	incoherent	beliefs,	then	you're	guaranteed	to	violate a requirement of epistemic rationality, since you cannot respect your evidence while also remaining coherent. In such cases, you face an epistemic dilemma in which	epistemic	rationality	issues	inconsistent	requirements. Worsnip (2018a) explores a version of this puzzle that is generated by higher-order evidence: that is,	evidence	about	your	own	evidence.	The	key idea is that	when	you	have	misleading	higher-order	evidence,	your	total	evidence	can	be misleading about itself. For example, your total evidence can support the proposition that p while also supporting the higher-order proposition that your total	evidence	doesn't	support	p.	In	that	case,	your	evidence	makes	it	substantively rational	to	believe	the	conjuncts	of	an	abominable	conjunction: p	but	I	shouldn't	believe	p	because	my	total	evidence	doesn't	support	p. 4 This	generates	a	version	of	Moore's	paradox,	since	the	abominable	conjunction	is consistent and yet it nevertheless seems epistemically irrational to believe it (Smithies 2012; Horowitz 2014). Someone who believes the conjuncts of this conjunction	is	epistemically	akratic	in	a	way	that	seems	irrational.	Just	as	it	seems irrational	to	act	in	conflict	with	your	beliefs	about	how	you	should	act,	so	it	seems irrational to hold beliefs that conflict with your beliefs about what you should believe. Akrasia, whether practical or epistemic, is a paradigmatic form of structural irrationality. Nevertheless, Worsnip argues, your evidence makes it substantively rational to be epistemically akratic. Hence, there is an apparent conflict	between	structural	and	substantive	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality. Worsnip	illustrates	the	point	with	the	following	example: Miss	Marple	and	Mabel.	Miss	Marple	is	a	detective	who	is	famously	good at	assessing	evidence.	Miss	Marple	is	investigating	a	murder	that	took	place at	the	mansion	on	the	hill,	and	she	takes	her	great	niece	Mabel	along	with her. Miss Marple and Mabel set about the mansion collecting clues. Unfortunately, in their initial sweep	of the	house,	nothing that they learn offers any kind of significant support to any particular hypothesis about who committed the crime. As part of her training of Mabel as her apprentice,	after	they	have	finished	examining	a	crime	scene,	Miss	Marple always tells Mabel what [is] her own assessment of what the evidence supports.	On this occasion,	Miss	Marple	makes an uncharacteristic error, and	declares	to	Mabel,	"the	clues	lying	around	the	house	that	you	have	seen up	to	this	point	support	believing	that	the	vicar	did	it".	(2018a:	24) Although	the	clues	themselves	are	not	probative,	Miss	Marple's	expert testimony provides	higher-order	evidence	that	the	clues	incriminate	the	vicar.	According	to Worsnip,	Mabel's total	evidence	supports	agnosticism	about	whether the	vicar is guilty, while also supporting the higher-order belief that her evidence supports believing	this	conclusion.	And	yet	it	seems	structurally	irrational	for	Mabel	to	hold meta-incoherent	beliefs,	which	she	might	express	as	follows:	"Given	my	evidence,	I should	believe	the	vicar	is	guilty,	but	I	refuse	to	believe	this."	Hence,	Mabel	seems faced	with	an	epistemic	dilemma,	since	she	cannot	respect	her	evidence	while	also maintaining	meta-coherence. David Christensen (2007) gives similar examples in which you have misleading	evidence	about	your	own	logical	reasoning	abilities: Reason-Distorting Drugs. Suppose that I work out	my proof of T after having coffee	with	my friend Jocko. Palms sweaty	with the excitement of logical	progress,	I	check	my	work	several	times,	and	decide	that	the	proof	is good.	But	then	a	trusted	colleague	walks	in	and	tells	me	that	Jocko	has	been surreptitiously slipping a reason-distorting drug into people's coffee – a drug	whose	effects include	a	strong	propensity	to	reasoning	errors in	99% of	those	who	have	been	dosed	(1%	of	the	population	happen	to	be	immune). 5 He tells me that those who have been impaired do not notice any difficulties	with	their	own	cognition	–	they	just	make	mistakes;	indeed,	the only	change	most	of	them	notice	is	unusually	sweaty	palms.	(2007:	10) Christensen argues that it's irrational to be certain that T while doubting the reasoning	that leads	to	this	conclusion,	since	this is	a form	of	meta-incoherence. However,	your	evidence	that	you	have	ingested	the	drug	makes	it	rational	to	doubt your	own	reasoning.	And	yet	probabilistic	coherence	requires	being	certain	that	T, since	T	is	a	logical	truth	that	has	probability	1.	This	means	that	you	are	guaranteed to	violate	one	of	the	following	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality: LOGIC:	An	agent's	beliefs	must	respect	logic	by	satisfying	(some	version	of) probabilistic	coherence. EVIDENCE:	An	agent's	beliefs	(at least	about	logically	contingent	matters) must	be	proportioned	to	the	agent's	evidence. INTEGRATION: An agent's object-level beliefs must reflect the agent's meta-level	beliefs	about	the	reliability	of	the	cognitive	processes	underlying her	object-level	beliefs.	(2007:	20) You	cannot respect	your	higher-order	evidence	about	your	own	reasoning,	while also	integrating	your	first-order	and	higher-order	beliefs in	a	meta-coherent	way, without	thereby	violating	probabilistic	coherence.	Hence,	you	seem	faced	with	an epistemic dilemma in which you are guaranteed to violate a requirement of epistemic	rationality. Some	epistemologists	deny that	meta-coherence is	a	genuine requirement of	epistemic	rationality	(Coates	2012;	Weatherson	2019;	Lasonen-Aarnio	2020).	And yet this is not enough to dissolve the puzzle. We can generate puzzle cases through apparent conflicts between LOGIC and EVIDENCE without invoking INTEGRATION.	In	the	simplest	cases,	you	receive	expert	testimony	that	T	is	false, when	in	fact	T	is	a	logical	truth.	In	such	cases,	you	need	not	have	any	misleading higher-order evidence about your own reasoning abilities. Even so, it seems plausible	that	the	expert	testimony	gives	you	misleading	evidence	about	logic.	But you	cannot	respect	this	evidence	without	violating	probabilistic	coherence. Some epistemologists deny that probabilistic coherence is a genuine requirement of epistemic rationality (Weatherson 2019). But this is still not enough	to	dissolve the	puzzle, since	we	can	generate	apparent	conflicts	between evidence	and	coherence	without	making	any	assumptions	about	the	exact	form	of these coherence requirements. Whichever beliefs are prohibited by these coherence	requirements,	we	can	imagine	receiving	expert	testimony	that	provides misleading evidence that those beliefs are true. Hence, we cannot dissolve the puzzle by rejecting specific coherence requirements unless we make the implausible	claim	there	are	no	coherence	requirements	at	all. 6 2. Bifurcationist	Solutions This	section	examines	various	bifurcationist	strategies	for	solving	the	puzzle.	One of the	main arguments for bifurcationism is that the structural and substantive requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	are	distinct	because	they	conflict	when	your evidence supports incoherent beliefs. Hence, proponents of bifurcationism typically accept claim (1) and try to solve the puzzle in some other way. This section	examines	four	different	bifurcationist	strategies	for	solving	the	puzzle	and finds	problems	with	them	all. 2.1. Epistemic	Dilemmas The first strategy is to reject claim (4) that epistemic rationality never issues inconsistent requirements (Hughes 2019). On this view, epistemic rationality always	requires	respecting	your	evidence,	and	always	requires	coherence,	although you cannot always satisfy both requirements. When your evidence supports incoherent	beliefs,	you	ought	to	hold	these	beliefs	because	they	are	supported	by your	evidence,	but	at	the	same	time	you	ought	not	to	hold	them	because	they	are incoherent.	These	cases	are	dilemmas in	the	strict	sense	that	they instantiate	the formal	schema	below: Dilemmas:	Oφ	&	O¬φ There is no logical contradiction in the claim that there can	be	dilemmas, since O¬φ	doesn't	imply	¬Oφ.	Nevertheless,	this	claim	yields	logical	contradiction	when combined	with	standard	principles	in	deontic	logic,	such	as	the	following: Ought-Implies-May:	Oφ	→	Pφ Duality:	Pφ	→	¬O¬φ Together,	these	two	principles	imply	that	Oφ	→	¬O¬φ,	which	is	inconsistent	with the	thesis	that	there	are	dilemmas. Similarly,	we	can	derive	a	logical	contradiction	from	the	claim	that	there	are dilemmas	given	the	three	principles	below: Agglomeration:	Oφ	&	Oψ	→	O	(φ	&	ψ) Ought-Implies-Can:	Oφ	→	Cφ Can't	do	the	Impossible:	¬C	(φ	&	¬φ) Suppose there are strict dilemmas in which I ought to	φ and I ought not to	φ. Given the agglomeration principle, I ought both to	φ and to refrain from	φ-ing. Given	the	ought-implies-can	principle,	it	follows	that	I	can	both	φ	and	refrain	from φ-ing. And yet I cannot both φ and refrain from φ-ing, since this is logically impossible.	Once	again,	we	derive	a	logical	contradiction. 7 Hughes (2019) defends the coherence of dilemmas by rejecting the agglomeration principle and the ought-implies-may principle. And yet rejecting these principles comes with a significant theoretical cost in simplicity or explanatory	power.	Either	we	cannot	explain	the	correctness	of	patterns	of	deontic reasoning that are validated by these principles or else	we	must complicate the explanation	by	restricting	these	principles	so	they	don't	apply in	full	generality. I doubt	these	costs	are	worth	paying	to	make	sense	of	epistemic	dilemmas. Moreover,	there	is	a	problem	with	the	very	idea	of	an	epistemic	dilemma	in which	epistemic	rationality	issues	inconsistent	requirements.	Epistemic	rationality is	a	dimension	of	epistemic	value:	there	is	always	some	value	in	being	epistemically rational, though it	may	be	outweighed	by	conflicting	values.	To	be	epistemically rational is to	satisfy	all the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	But if there	are strict dilemmas in which epistemic rationality issues inconsistent requirements, then it is logically impossible to	satisfy	all	of them	at	once.	And	there	can	be	no value	in	satisfying	all	the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	when	it	is	logically impossible	to	do	so,	since	there	can	be	nothing	of	value in	a logically impossible scenario.	Hence,	the	very	idea	of	an	epistemic	dilemma	compromises	the	value	of epistemic	rationality. Proponents	of	epistemic	dilemmas	may	retreat	to	the	claim	that	epistemic rationality is valuable only insofar as it is logically possible to achieve it. Rather than	compromising	the	value	of	epistemic	rationality,	however,	it	seems	preferable to	maintain that epistemic rationality is always valuable by denying that it ever issues logically inconsistent requirements.	Arguably, it is an adequacy constraint on any theory of epistemic rationality that it should delineate something that always	has	epistemic	value.	This	is	enough	to	motivate	the	search	for	a	solution	to our	puzzle	that	avoids	positing	epistemic	dilemmas. 2.2. Prima	Facie	Requirements The second option is to treat the structural and substantive requirements of epistemic rationality as mere prima facie requirements to maximize various rational ideals, which can come into conflict (Christensen 2007). On this view, there	can	be	conflicts	between	the	rational	ideals	of	coherence	and	respecting	your evidence.	Other things	equal,	you	should	maximize	each	of these	rational ideals, but	things	are	unequal	when	they	conflict.	In	such	cases,	you're	not	required	to	do the	impossible:	namely,	to	be	perfectly	coherent	while	also	perfectly	respecting	the evidence.	Rather,	you	are	required	to	find	the	best	overall	balance	between	these rational	ideals.	As	Christensen	writes,	"We're	quite	familiar	with	other	ideals	that operate	as	values	to	be	maximized,	yet	whose	maximization	must	in	certain	cases be	balanced	against,	or	otherwise	constrained	by,	other	values"	(2007:	24). On this view, conflicts between rational ideals do not generate strict dilemmas in	which	you're required	both to	believe	and to refrain from	believing one	and the same	proposition.	At	best, these conflicts generate	dilemmas in the colloquial	sense:	that	is,	hard	cases	in	which	it's	not	obvious	how	you	should	weigh conflicting values against each other. And yet some conflicts	may generate easy 8 cases in which it seems clear how they should be resolved. For example, Christensen	claims	that	it's	not	rationally	optimal	to	be	probabilistically	coherent in	the	face	of	higher-order	evidence	of	your	own	cognitive imperfection. Instead, you	should	reduce	your	confidence in logical truths	when	you	have	higher-order evidence	that	your	logical	reasoning	is	impaired	–	say,	by	reason-distorting	drugs. In such	cases, the	value	of	probabilistic	coherence is	outweighed	by the	value	of respecting	the	evidence	about	your	cognitive	abilities. How does this view solve the puzzle?	On this view, (2) and (3) are false because	epistemic	rationality	doesn't	always	require	respecting	your	evidence	and also remaining coherent. When your evidence supports incoherent beliefs, it's permissible to weigh these competing ideals against each other. Epistemic rationality requires only that your beliefs reflect some optimal balance between coherence	and	respecting	the	evidence. This	view	gives	a	more	plausible	treatment	of	hard	cases	than	treating	them as strict dilemmas. Consider Sartre's (1946) example of the student deciding whether	to	join	the	French	resistance	to	the	German	occupation	or	instead	to	stay at	home	with	his	mother	who	depends	on	him.	It	seems	absurd	to	suggest	that	he should	do	both things	when this is	clearly impossible. It is	vastly	more	plausible that	he	should	pursue	whichever	course	of	action	is	supported	by	stronger	reasons, although it may be hard to ascertain where the balance of reasons lies. If the reasons	are	equally	balanced,	of	course,	then	it	may	be	permissible	to	pursue	either course	of	action. Unfortunately,	we	cannot	extend	the	same	treatment	to	the	examples	that concern	us.	In	Sartre's	example,	there	is	a	conflict	between	substantive	reasons	for action, which derive from competing considerations about the value of helping your family	versus the	value	of	defending	your	nation.	What	you	ought to	do in such	cases	depends	on	the	overall	balance	of	substantive	reasons.	Our	examples,	in contrast,	do	not concern	conflicts	between substantive reasons,	but	between the substantive requirement to respect your reasons for belief and the structural requirement to	be coherent.	We	cannot resolve this conflict	by appealing to the overall	balance	of	substantive	reasons. The	objection	can	be	posed	as	a	dilemma.	Do	we	have	substantive	reasons to	be	coherent	or	not?	If	not,	we	have	no	model	for	weighing	substantive	against structural	considerations	in	determining	what	you	ought	to	believe.	This	imposes some	theoretical	pressure	to	say	that	we	have	substantive	reasons	to	be	coherent after all. But if so, the substantive reasons for belief provided by your evidence must	be	weighed	against	the	substantive	reasons	for	belief	provided	by	structural considerations	about	coherence.	And	this	is	to	reject	the	evidentialist	assumption that all substantive reasons for belief are provided by evidence alone. Evidentialism is	not sacrosanct,	of course,	but it is	plausible	enough to	motivate the	search	for	an	alternative	solution. 9 2.3. Rational	Indeterminacy The third option is that it's indeterminate what you should believe when substantive	and	structural	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	come	into	conflict (Leonard 2020).	On this view, conflicts between evidence and coherence do	not generate	epistemic	dilemmas	in	which	it's	determinately	true	that	you	ought	and ought not to believe one and the same proposition. On the contrary, these are cases	in	which	it's	indeterminate	what	you	ought	to	believe. In	a	supervaluationist	framework,	it's	determinately	true	that	you	ought	to hold	a	belief	just	in	case	the	belief	is	required	by	every	maximally	consistent	way	of resolving	the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	When	your	evidence	supports incoherent	beliefs,	it's	indeterminate	what	you	ought	to	believe	because	there	are multiple	ways	of	resolving	the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality,	which	diverge in what they require. Some resolutions require coherence, while others require respecting your evidence, although none require both. Hence, there are no epistemic	dilemmas,	since	it	is	determinately	false	that	you	ought	both	to	respect your	evidence	and	to	be	coherent	in	such	cases. How	does this view solve our	puzzle?	On this view,	neither (2)	nor (3) is determinately true, since it's not determinately true that epistemic rationality requires	you	to	respect	your	evidence,	or	that	it	requires	you	to	be	coherent,	when your evidence supports incoherent beliefs. On the contrary, it's indeterminate what	epistemic rationality requires in such	cases. Indeed, it's	determinately false that	epistemic	rationality	requires	both	coherence	and	respecting	your	evidence	in such	cases.	Hence,	the	conjunction	of	(2)	and	(3)	is	determinately	false. I	have	no	objection	to	the	general	claim	that	it's	sometimes	indeterminate what	you	should	believe	or	do.	I	see	no	special	reason	to	suppose	that	ethics	and epistemology are immune from indeterminacy. Arguably, though, this solution countenances too much normative indeterminacy, since it implies that the normative facts are indeterminate whenever conflicts arise between substantive and structural requirements of rationality.	Hence, this solution cannot vindicate intuitive	verdicts	about	what	we	should	believe	and	do	in	such	cases. Consider a pilot who has misleading evidence that she is suffering from hypoxia, but who calculates correctly that she has enough fuel to take a scenic detour en route to her final destination (Elga 2013). Although her evidence supports	this	conclusion, it	seems	reckless for	her	to	decide	on	this	basis to	take the	detour, rather than flying	directly to	her destination, given the	higher-order evidence that she is cognitively impaired by hypoxia. Intuitively, she shouldn't believe	or	act	on	the	conclusion	that	is	supported	by	her	evidence.	On	the	current proposal,	however,	it	is	indeterminate	whether	she	should	disrespect	her	evidence in this	way	or instead	violate	meta-coherence	by	believing	a conclusion that she regards as probably based on mistaken reasoning. Many will regard this as a counterintuitive	prediction	of	the	theory. Another problem is that this solution cannot vindicate the plausible theoretical principle that epistemic rationality always requires respecting your evidence and remaining coherent. Bifurcationism promises to accommodate the 10 normative	force	of	both	requirements	by	allowing	that	they	can	conflict.	And	yet this	solution	cannot	maintain	that	both	requirements	retain	their	normative	force when	they	conflict,	since it implies that it's indeterminate	which	one	you	should comply with. Worse, it implies that it's determinately true that you shouldn't comply with both requirements when they conflict. In other words, it's determinately	false	that	you	should	always	respect	your	evidence	while	remaining coherent.	This	is implausible	enough	to	motivate	the	search	for	a	solution	to	our puzzle	that	can	accommodate	the	normative	force	of	both	requirements. 2.4. Equivocation The	fourth	option	is	to	deny	that	there	is	any	single	sense	in	which	you	ought	to respect your evidence and to remain coherent when your evidence supports incoherent beliefs (Worsnip 2018a). On this view, these cases involve conflicts between	normative domains, rather than	within a single normative domain.	We cannot understand the distinction between substantive and structural requirements	in	terms	of	a	single	normative	concept	of	epistemic	rationality	that governs	what	we	should	believe.	Instead,	our	beliefs	are	governed	by	two	distinct and fundamentally different kinds of normative requirements that cannot be stated	using	the	same	normative	concept. How does this view solve our puzzle?	On this view, the appearance of a puzzle arises from an equivocation between two distinct normative concepts. There	is	no	single	normative	concept	of	epistemic	rationality	in	terms	of	which	we are	always	required	both	to	respect	our	evidence	and	to	be	coherent.	Hence,	there is	no	single	interpretation	on	which	both	(2)	and	(3)	are	true. This view has several advantages. First, it avoids strict dilemmas, which removes	any	pressure	to	revise	deontic	logic.	Second,	by	distinguishing	normative requirements,	it	promises	to	vindicate	the	plausible	theoretical	principle	that	you are	always	required	to	respect	your	evidence	and	to	remain	coherent.	Third,	since these requirements are fundamentally distinct, there is no danger of compromising evidentialism as a thesis about substantive reasons for belief by encroachment from	non-evidential considerations about coherence.	And, finally, since these requirements are incommensurable, there is no commitment to any common	scale	on	which	they	can	be	weighed	against	each	other. Despite	these	attractions,	however,	problems	remain.	One	problem	is	that it's	hard to	make	sense	of intuitions	about	what	you	should	do in	conflict cases. According	to	the	equivocation	strategy,	there	is	one	sense	in	which	you	ought	to respect	your	evidence	and	another	sense	in	which	you	ought	to	remain	coherent. But	this	doesn't	capture	the	intuitive	sense	that	it's	better	for	the	pilot	to	maintain meta-coherence, rather than respecting her evidence, when she acquires the higher-order	evidence	that	she	is	hypoxic. Indeed, the equivocation strategy doesn't even provide us with the conceptual	resources	for	asking	whether	it's	better	to	respect	evidence	or	maintain coherence	in	conflict	cases.	After	all,	we	have	no	single	normative	concept	in	terms of	which these conflicting requirements can be	weighed against each other.	We 11 can ask what substantive rationality requires, and we can ask what structural rationality	requires,	but	we	cannot	coherently	ask	which	of	these	requirements	are better	to	follow.	And	yet	it	does	seem	like	we	can	coherently	ask	this	question,	or something	like	it,	when	we	consider	the	hypoxia	case. Perhaps	the	deepest	problem	is	that	we	lose	the	attractive	idea	that	there	is any unified virtue of epistemic rationality that requires both coherence and respecting your evidence. According to the equivocation strategy, there is a substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence,	and	a	structural	requirement	to be coherent, but there is no single concept of epistemic rationality that unifies these	requirements.	Moreover,	we	cannot	reconstruct	a	unified	virtue	of	epistemic rationality	by	simply	conjoining	these	requirements.	After	all,	there	is	always	some value	in	epistemic	rationality,	but	there	is	no	value	in	satisfying	both	substantive and	structural	requirements	when	they	conflict,	since	this is logically impossible. There	is	no	value	in	what	is	logically	impossible. 3. Problems	for	Bifurcationism The previous section raised problems for bifurcationist attempts to solve the puzzle, whereas this section raises	more general problems for the bifurcationist assumption that generates the puzzle in the first place. I argue that we should reject the bifurcationist assumption that your evidence can support incoherent beliefs. Instead, we should prefer a more unified conception of epistemic rationality, which builds the structural requirements of coherence into the substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence.	We	should	prefer	unificationism to bifurcationism because (i) it is	more parsimonious, (ii) it better explains the value of coherence, and (iii) the distinction between substantive and structural requirements is dubiously intelligible in the first place. Let's take these three points	in	reverse	order. 3.1. No	Intelligible	Distinction My first argument is that there is	no intelligible	distinction	between substantive and	structural requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	We	cannot	ultimately	make sense of the idea that some requirements of epistemic rationality are purely substantive,	rather	than	structural,	or	vice	versa.	As	Ralph	Wedgwood	writes,	this is	"a	distinction	without	a	difference"	(2017:	11). Consider	first	the	requirement	to	proportion	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence. Can we	make any sense of the idea that this requirement is purely substantive rather than structural? The requirement is that your degree of belief in a proposition should be proportionate with the degree to which your evidence supports that proposition. But the degree to which your evidence supports a proposition	depends	not	only	on	substantive	facts	about	what	your	evidence	is,	but also	on	structural	facts	about	the	evidential	support	relation.	Without	invoking	the structure	of	the	evidential	support	relation,	we	cannot	explain	how	your	evidence supports any given	proposition to any given	degree.	Hence, there is a structural dimension	built	into	the	requirement	to	proportion	your	beliefs	to	the	evidence. 12 Why is it, for example, that your evidence	never supports contradictions? This is because there are logical constraints built into the structure of the evidential support relation.	Your	evidence supports	a	contradiction,	p and	not-p, only	if	it	supports	both	conjuncts.	But	your	evidence	cannot	support	a	proposition while also supporting its negation. These logical constraints on the evidential support	relation	are	best	captured	within	a	probabilistic	framework,	according	to which	your	evidence	supports	a	proposition	only	if	it	is	more	probable	than	not	on your	evidence	that it is true. It	cannot	be	that	a	proposition	and	its	negation	are both	more	probable than	not to	be true, since the	probability	of the	disjunction must	sum	to	one.	Hence,	your	evidence	never	supports	contradictory	propositions. Now	consider the requirement to	be	coherent.	Can	we	make	any	sense	of the idea that this requirement is purely structural rather than substantive? Coherence	requires	that	your	beliefs	stand	in	certain	relations	to	your	other	beliefs and	mental states.	This requirement	has a structural	dimension,	which	concerns the structure of the relations that must hold between your beliefs and other mental	states.	But	it	also	has	a	substantive	dimension,	which	concerns	the	mental states	that	fall	within	its	scope. Which	mental states fall	within the scope of the coherence requirement? The most plausible answer is that epistemic rationality requires your beliefs to cohere	not just	with	your	other	beliefs,	but also	with	all the	other	mental states that	provide	you	with	evidence.	The	assumption	here	is	not	that	your	evidence	is exhausted	by	facts	about	your	mental	states,	but	merely	that	you	possess	evidence in virtue of being in certain mental states. I claim that your beliefs are fully coherent	when	they	fit	together	in	the	right	way	with	all	the	mental	states	in	virtue of	which	you	possess	evidence. Epistemic	rationality	requires	that	your	beliefs	cohere	with	each	other.	This is	a	consequence	of	the	fact	that	your	beliefs	provide	you	with	defeasible	evidence, which may be defeated by the evidence provided by other beliefs. Plausibly, however,	your	experiences	provide	you	with	evidence	as	well	as	your	beliefs.	This means that your beliefs can cohere	with each other without cohering in all the ways	that	matter	for	epistemic	rationality.	Magic	Feldman	is	a	case	in	point:	he	is epistemically	irrational	because	his	beliefs	cohere	with	each	other	but	not	with	his experiences. Epistemic rationality requires that his beliefs cohere with all the mental	states	that	provide	him	with	evidence,	including	his	experiences	as	well	as his	other	beliefs. Epistemic	rationality	doesn't require	that	your	beliefs	cohere	with	all	your mental states. For example, it is not epistemically irrational to believe a proposition	while subdoxastically representing its negation in a	mental	module. This is because your subdoxastic	mental representations, unlike your beliefs, do not provide you with evidence. Epistemic rationality requires that your beliefs cohere	with	all	and	only	those	mental	states	that	provide	you	with	evidence. How	exactly	should	your	beliefs	cohere	with	the	mental	states	that	provide you with evidence? The most plausible answer is that the structure of the coherence requirement derives from the structure of the evidential support 13 relation.	Your	beliefs	should	cohere	with	the	mental	states	that	provide	you	with evidence in accordance with the structure of the evidential support relation. Hence,	the	coherence	requirement	for	epistemic	rationality	is	none	other	than	the requirement	to	hold	beliefs	that	cohere	with	your	evidence. The	upshot is that there is	no intelligible	distinction	between substantive and	structural	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	Fundamentally, there is just one	requirement	of	epistemic	rationality,	which	incorporates	both	substantive	and structural dimensions. This is the evidentialist requirement to proportion your beliefs	to	the	evidence	in	the	sense	that	they	cohere	with	substantive	facts	about your evidence in accordance with structural facts about the evidential support relation.	If	your	beliefs	are	fully	proportioned	to	the	evidence,	then	they	are	fully coherent,	and	also	vice	versa.	Coherence	and	respecting	the	evidence	are	two	sides of	the	same	coin. 3.2. The	Value	of	Coherence My second argument concerns the value of coherence. If unificationism is true, then the value	of coherence consists in the value	of respecting your evidence. If bifurcationism	is	true,	however,	the	value	of	coherence	is	much	harder	to	explain. What is the value of coherence when it comes at the cost of respecting your evidence?	Does	it	have	any	genuine	epistemic	value	or	does	it	merely	reflect	some fetish	for	neat	and	tidy	belief	systems?	And	if	coherence	has	no	genuine	epistemic value, then what is the normative force of the structural requirement to be coherent?	Do	we	have	any	good	reason	to	be	coherent? One	answer	is	that	coherence	has	intrinsic	value.	This	has	some	plausibility given the	unificationist view that the	value	of coherence consists in the	value	of respecting your evidence. And yet it is much less plausible that coherence has intrinsic	value	when	it	results	from	disrespecting	your	evidence.	As	Niko	Kolodny writes, "It seems outlandish that the kind of psychic tidiness that . . . formal coherence	enjoins	should	be	set	alongside	such	final	ends	as	pleasure,	friendship, and	knowledge"	(2007:	241). A second answer is that coherence has instrumental value because it is a means to an end that has intrinsic value – namely, respecting your evidence. Again, this claim has some plausibility given the unificationist view that your evidence	always	supports	coherent	beliefs,	since	your	beliefs	must	be	coherent	to respect your evidence. And yet it is	much less plausible given the bifurcationist view	that	your	evidence	can	support	incoherent	beliefs.	How	is	coherence	a	means to the end of respecting your evidence in such cases? If conflict cases are rare enough, then perhaps coherence is a reliable though not infallible way of respecting	your	evidence.	Once	we	divorce	evidence	and	coherence,	however,	it	is far	from	clear	that	conflict	cases	will	be	the	exception	rather	than	the	rule. A third answer is that coherence has instrumental value because it is a necessary	condition	for	agency,	the	capacity	to	act	on	beliefs	and	desires.	If	there are coherence constraints built into the nature of agency, then perhaps we can derive the value of coherence from the value of agency. The assumption is 14 questionable,	since	it	is	not	clear	why	a	Lewisian	madman	cannot	act	on	the	basis of	beliefs	and	desires	that	are	completely	incoherent	(Smithies	et	al.	forthcoming). Even	granting	this	assumption,	however,	problems	remain. One problem is that any coherence constraints on agency must be extremely weak. Perfect coherence cannot be required for agency, since human agents	fall	well	short	of	this	demanding	threshold.	At	best,	agency	requires	some minimal	degree	of	coherence.	So	what	explains	the	added	value	of	increasing	your degree of coherence beyond this minimal threshold? Presumably, it is not necessary	for	being	an	agent	that	you	increase	your	degree	of	coherence	so	long	as you	meet	the	minimal	threshold	to	qualify	as	an	agent	in	the	first	place. Another	general	problem	with	this	strategy	is	that	it	presupposes	the	value of	agency	without	explaining	it.	Why	are	we	entitled	to	this	assumption?	As	David Enoch (2006) articulates the question,	why should	we care about	agency, rather than	schmagency?	As	I'll	explain,	this	challenge	is	especially	urgent	for	proponents of	bifurcationism	who	build	coherence	constraints	into	the	nature	of	agency. Consider Worsnip's (2018a) bifurcationist thesis that your total evidence can	support	an	incoherent	set	of	beliefs.	Now	combine	this	with	Worsnip's	(2018b) claim	that	a	set	of	beliefs	is	incoherent	just	in	case	it	is	partially	constitutive	of	the nature	of	belief	that	any	agent	is	disposed	to	revise	those	beliefs	under	conditions of	full	self-knowledge.	A	consequence	of	these	two	claims	is	that	there	cannot	be an ideal epistemic agent whose beliefs are always perfectly proportioned to her evidence.	Whenever	her	evidence	supports	incoherent	beliefs,	such	an	agent	holds incoherent	beliefs	under	conditions	of full self-knowledge	with	no	disposition to abandon them. But Worsnip's account of incoherence excludes this possibility, since	it	is	inconsistent	with	the	coherence	constraints	on	the	nature	of	belief. This	is	a	surprising	result.	It	is	often	thought	to	be	possible	in	principle,	if not in practice, that there could be an ideal epistemic agent whose beliefs are always	perfectly	proportioned	to	her	evidence.	And	yet	this	possibility	is	excluded by combining Worsnip's bifurcationism with his account of incoherence. More importantly, anyone	who	bites this	bullet faces an	awkward	normative	question. What	is	the	normative	significance	of	the	fact	that	the	constitutive	nature	of	belief precludes	incoherence	under	conditions	of	full	self-knowledge?	Is	it	a	good	thing because it provides us	with some	protection against incoherence?	Or is it a bad thing because it imposes an obstacle that prevents us from proportioning our proportioning	our	beliefs	to	the	evidence? The	second	answer	is	hard	to	avoid.	The	nature	of	belief,	desire,	and	agency is	normatively	defective	insofar	as	it	excludes	the	possibility	of	proportioning	your beliefs	to	the	evidence	in	conflict	cases.	Given	the	value	of	substantive	rationality, it	would	be	better	not	to	be	an	agent	with	beliefs	and	desires,	since	the	coherence constraints on agency pose an obstacle to substantive rationality. It would be better to have belief-like and desire-like states that are not subject to these coherence constraints. In	Enoch's terms, it	would	be	better to	be a "schmagent" with	"schmeliefs"	and	"schmesires",	rather	than	an	agent	with	beliefs	and	desires. 15 I conclude that proponents of bifurcationism cannot derive the value of coherence from the value of agency. More generally, I suspect that we cannot explain the value of coherence	without endorsing the unificationist view that it reduces	to	the	value	of	respecting	your	evidence. 3.3. Occam's	Razor My	third	and	final	argument	is	an	appeal	to	theoretical	parsimony.	Bifurcationism says that the	substantive	and	structural requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	are distinct	and	sui	generis.	My	version	of	unificationism,	in	contrast,	says	there	is	just one	requirement	of	epistemic	rationality,	which incorporates	both	structural	and substantive	dimensions	–	namely,	to	hold	beliefs	that	cohere	with	your	evidence. Hence, parsimony favors this view by an application of Occam's razor: don't multiply	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	beyond	necessity! This argument is not conclusive, of course, since Occam's razor permits multiplying requirements of epistemic rationality when it is necessary to do so. Nevertheless, it is enough to impose	an	argumentative	burden	on	proponents	of bifurcationism.	Do	we	have	any	good	reason	to	divorce	the	structural	requirement of coherence from the substantive requirement to respect your evidence? One argument is that we need to recognize sui generis coherence requirements to explain	the	normative	difference	between	subjects	who	differ	in	coherence	without respecting	their	evidence.	In	response,	however,	I'll	argue	that	we	can	explain	the intuitive	data	without	appealing	to	sui	generis	coherence	requirements. Consider	three	detectives	working	on	a	case	who	disagree	about	the	cause of	the	victim's	death: • Amy	is	agnostic	about	whether	it	is	murder	or	suicide. • Beth	believes	it	is	murder,	rather	than	suicide. • Carl	believes	it	is	murder,	and	also	believes	it	is	suicide,	although	he	knows it	cannot	be	both	murder	and	suicide. Let's	assume	that	only	Amy	succeeds	in	proportioning	her	beliefs	to	the	evidence, since the	evidence is	neutral	between	murder	and	suicide.	Hence,	Beth	and	Carl fare equally poorly in responding to the evidence. Nevertheless, there is an intuitive	sense	in	which	Beth	is	doing	epistemically	better	than	Carl,	since	at	least her	beliefs	are	coherent.	Bifurcationism	can	explain	this	easily.	Although	they	both violate the substantive requirement to respect their evidence, only	Beth satisfies the structural requirement to have coherent beliefs. The challenge for unificationism	is	to	explain	the	intuitive	sense	that	Beth	does	epistemically	better than Carl without divorcing the structural requirements of coherence from the substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence. My	response	is	that	Beth	is	more	reasonable	than	Carl	in	the	sense	that	she manifests	better	reasoning	dispositions,	which	dispose	her	to	succeed	in	respecting her	evidence	in	other	cases	(Lasonen-Aarnio	2010).	To	see	the	point,	suppose	this is	a	hard	case:	although	the	evidence	is	neutral	between	murder	and	suicide,	it	is 16 easily	confused	with	a	simpler	case	in	which	the	evidence	clearly	supports	murder, rather than	suicide.	Beth is	disposed to	proportion	her	beliefs to the	evidence in the easy case, but not the	hard case,	whereas	Carl is disposed to proportion	his beliefs	to	the	evidence	in	neither	case.	In	that	sense,	Beth's	reasoning	dispositions are	more	responsive	to	evidence	than	Carl's.	This	explains	the	intuitive	sense	that Beth does epistemically better than Carl without divorcing requirements of coherence	from	the	substantive	requirement	to	respect	the	evidence. I'm	assuming	that	Beth's	reasoning	dispositions	are	imperfectly	sensitive	to evidence	in	such	a	way	that	she	respects	her	evidence	in	easy	cases	but	not	hard cases.	Of	course,	we	can	stipulate	a	case	in	which	Beth	has	coherent	beliefs	that	do not	result from	evidence-sensitive	dispositions	at	all.	But	now	I lose	my intuitive sense that she is doing epistemically better than Carl. Perhaps it's just a lucky coincidence	that	her	beliefs	are	coherent	or	perhaps	there	is	some	explanation	that involves	no	evidence-sensitive	dispositions.	Either	way,	I	doubt	that	the	coherence in	her	belief	system	reflects	anything	of	epistemic	value. The	key	challenge	for	proponents	of	bifurcationism	is	to	explain	what	value there is in	coherence	when it	doesn't result from	evidence-sensitive	dispositions. Otherwise,	there	is	no	need	to	bifurcate	structural	and	substantive	requirements	in order	to	explain	the	intuitive	normative	difference	between	subjects	who	differ	in coherence	while failing to respect their evidence.	Of course, this is not the only argument for bifurcationism. In the	next two sections, I'll address the argument that	we	should	divorce	substantive	and	structural	requirements	because	they	can come	into	conflict	when	you	have	evidence	that	supports	incoherent	beliefs. 4. The	Unificationist	Solution According to my unificationist proposal, there is just one fundamental requirement of epistemic rationality – namely, the evidentialist requirement to proportion your beliefs to your evidence. Your beliefs are proportioned to your evidence	when	your	degree	of	belief	in	any	given	proposition	matched	the	degree to	which	your	evidence	supports	that	proposition.	Moreover,	the	degree	to	which your	evidence	supports	a	proposition	is	a	function	of	two	things:	substantive	facts about your evidence together with structural facts about the evidential support relation. Hence, the evidentialist requirement incorporates both structural and substantive dimensions: epistemic rationality requires that your beliefs cohere with substantive facts about your evidence in accordance with structural facts about	the	evidential	support	relation. How	does	this	version	of	unificationism	solve	our	puzzle	about	the	conflict between	evidence	and	evidence?	On this view, there can	be	no	conflict	between evidence	and	coherence (cf.	Kolodny	2007;	Kiesewetter	2017;	Lord	2018).	Anyone who respects their evidence is guaranteed to be coherent, since there are coherence constraints built into the structure of the evidential support relation. These	structural	constraints	on	the	evidential	support	relation	guarantee	that	your evidence never supports incoherent beliefs. We can therefore maintain that 17 epistemic	rationality	always	requires	not	only	coherence,	but	also	respecting	your evidence,	without	countenancing	epistemic	dilemmas. Formal	theories	of	epistemic	rationality	typically	impose	logical	constraints on	the	evidential	support	relation.	These	constraints	explain	the	plausible	datum that epistemically rational agents are logically coherent. Epistemically rational agents have logically consistent beliefs because they always believe what their evidence supports and their evidence never supports logically inconsistent propositions. Similarly, they believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs because	the	evidential	support	relation	is	closed	under	logical	consequence: The Evidential Closure Principle: Necessarily, if p entails that q, and your total	evidence	supports	p	to	degree	n,	then	your	total	evidence	supports	q	to degree	n	or	greater. This	principle	implies	that	every	logical	truth	is	supported	to	the	maximal	degree	– namely,	certainty	by	every	possible	body	of	evidence.	After	all,	any	logical	truth	is entailed	by	anything	else	and	entailment	is	the	strongest	kind	of	support	relation. Hence,	this	principle	encodes	a	requirement	of	logical	omniscience:	since	all	logical truths	are	certain	on	your	evidence,	epistemic	rationality	requires	that	you	should be	certain	of	any	logical	truth	towards	which	you	adopt	any	doxastic	attitude	at	all. Some epistemologists take lottery and preface paradoxes to undermine logical consistency and closure requirements on epistemic rationality. However, the logical constraints on belief can be preserved in the form of probabilistic constraints on degrees of belief or credences (Christensen 2004). On this view, epistemic	rationality	requires	that	your	credences	are	probabilistically	coherent	in the	sense	that	they	conform	to	the	axioms	of	the	probability	calculus: (1) For	every	p,	Pr	(p)	≥	0. (2) If	p	is	a	tautology,	then	Pr	(p)	=	1. (3) If p and q are mutually exclusive, then Pr (p ∨ q) = Pr (p) + Pr (q). (Christensen	2004:	16) On a probabilistic conception of the evidential support relation, degrees of evidential support	are	evidential	probabilities.	Epistemically rational thinkers	are probabilistically	coherent	because	the	evidential	support	relation	is	constrained	by the	axioms	of	the	probability	calculus.	In	particular,	epistemically	rational	thinkers are logically omniscient because it is an axiom that logical truths always have probability	1.	Hence,	probabilistic	coherence	also	encodes	a	requirement	of	logical omniscience. In	addition	to	these	logical	or	probabilistic	constraints,	we	should	recognize higher-order constraints on the evidential support relation. On a probabilistic conception of evidential support, these can be formulated as constraints on higher-order	probabilities,	such	as	the	following: 18 Probabilistic	Accessibilism:	Necessarily,	if	it	is	evidentially	probable	that	p	to degree	n,	then	it	is	evidentially	certain	that	it	is	evidentially	probable	that	p to	degree	n	(Smithies	2019:	230). The rationale for	higher-order	constraints is to	explain	why	epistemic rationality requires	meta-coherence. Intuitively, epistemically rational agents always	believe what	they	believe	they	should	believe.	Just	as	it	seems	irrational	to	act	akratically in conflict	with your beliefs about how you should act, so it seems irrational to believe	akratically in	conflict	with	your	beliefs	about	how	you	should	believe.	To explain	why epistemic akrasia is always irrational,	we need to recognize higherorder constraints as	well as first-order logical or probabilistic constraints on the evidential support relation. Epistemically rational agents are meta-coherent because they always proportion their beliefs to their evidence and they always know	with	certainty	what	their	own	evidence	supports. This	higher-order	constraint	on	the	evidential	support	relation	is	extremely demanding, but I doubt we can settle for anything	weaker. For example, Adam Elga's	(2013)	New	Rational	Reflection	Principle	doesn't	require	being	certain	of	the evidential	probability	that	p,	so	long	as	your	credence	in	p	matches	the	weighted average	of	your	expectations	about	the	evidential	probability	that	p.	And	yet	this principle	is	not	strong	enough	to	prohibit	a	form	of	epistemic	akrasia	in	which	you are	certain	that	your	credence	is	irrational,	although	you	have	no	idea	whether	it should	be	higher	or lower.	To rule this	out,	we	need to	maintain that evidential probabilities	are	always	evidentially	certain. This higher-order constraint on the evidential support relation can be explained	as	a	consequence	of	two	more	basic	assumptions.	First,	necessary	truths about	the	evidential	support	relation	have	the	same	epistemic	status	as	necessary truths about logic. Just as logical truths are certain given any possible body of evidence, so are necessary truths about the evidential support relation. The normalization axiom assigns probability 1 to all necessary truths that hold throughout the epistemic space over which evidential probabilities are defined. These	epistemic	necessities include	necessary	truths	about	the	evidential	support relation	as	well	as	necessary	truths	about	logic.	This	yields	an	evidentialist	version of Titelbaum's fixed-point thesis, according to which "no situation rationally permits	an	a	priori	false	belief	about	which	overall	states	are	rationally	permitted in	which	situations"	(2015:	293). Second, all contingent truths about your evidence are self-evident in the sense	that	they	make	themselves	evident: The Self-Evidence of Evidence: Necessarily, if your evidence includes (or excludes) the fact that p, then it's evidentially certain that your evidence includes	(or	excludes)	the	fact	that	p. The claim that all evidence is self-evident is a plausible consequence of a phenomenal conception of evidence, according to which your evidence is 19 exhausted	by	phenomenally individuated facts about your current	mental states. On this	view,	you	have the same	evidence	as	your	phenomenal	duplicate	who is deceived	by	an	evil	demon,	since	there	is	no	difference	in	how	things	seem	to	you. Assuming	that	skepticism	is	false,	your	evidence	that	it	seems	to	you	that	p	favors the anti-skeptical hypothesis that p over the skeptical hypothesis that it	merely falsely	seems	that	p.	Arguably,	however,	since	your	evidence	is	consistent	with	the skeptical	hypothesis, it	doesn't rule it	out	with	certainty,	but	merely	with	a	high degree	of	probability. In	contrast,	propositions	about	your	own	phenomenal	evidence	are	immune from	demonic	deception.	Your	phenomenal	evidence	can	be	misleading	about	how things	are but not about how things seem. This is because your evidence about how	things	seem	is	constituted	by	the	facts	about	how	things	seem,	rather	than	by second-order seemings that can misrepresent those phenomenal facts.	When it seems	that	p, it is	evidentially	certain	that it	seems	that	p,	since	your	evidence	is inconsistent with any skeptical possibility in which things seem otherwise. A demon can induce false beliefs about how things seem, but he cannot induce justified false beliefs by giving you misleading evidence. Your evidence never justifies	false	beliefs	about	how	things	seem,	since	your	evidence	about	how	things seem	is	constituted	by	how	things	seem.	Your	phenomenal	evidence	is	self-evident in	the	sense	that	it	entails	itself	and	thereby	makes	itself	certain. With these two	claims in	hand,	we	can	explain	why	your	evidence	always makes it certain	whether it supports any given proposition to any given degree. This	is	because	contingent	truths	about	your	evidence	and	necessary	truths	about the	evidential	support	relation	are	always	certain	given	your	evidence.	Necessarily, if	your	total	evidence	e	makes	it	evidentially	probable	for	you	that	p to	degree	n, then	it	is	evidentially	certain	for	you	that: (1) You	have	total	evidence	e. (2) If	you	have	total	evidence	e,	then	it	is	evidentially	probable	for	you	that	p	to degree	n. (3) Therefore,	it	is	evidentially	probable	for	you	that	p	to	degree	n. In sum, higher-order constraints on the evidential support relation can be explained as a natural consequence of a phenomenal conception of evidence, which can be motivated on independent grounds by appealing to standard internalism	intuitions	about	skeptical	scenarios. It	is	a	familiar	claim	that	epistemic	rationality	requires	logical	omniscience, but	this	can	be	regarded	as	a	special	case	of	the	more	general	claim	that	epistemic rationality requires evidential omniscience. Perfectly rational agents are not only certain	of	all	logical	truths	but	they	are	also	certain	of	all	truths	about	what	their evidence	is	and	what	it	supports.	This	requirement	may	seem	unduly	demanding, but it is a consequence	of the	plausible thesis that epistemic rationality requires respecting logic and evidence	while remaining	meta-coherent. If you violate the requirement	of	logical	or	evidential	omniscience,	and	you	integrate	your	reasoning 20 with your beliefs about logic and evidence, then your reasoning fails to respect logic	and	evidence.	Your	doubts	about logic	and	evidence	"trickle	down" in	ways that lead	you to	disrespect logic	and	evidence.	These requirements	are	not	mere scientific idealizations – that is, false predictions of a theory that can be safely ignored for practical purposes. Rather, they are normative ideals that non-ideal agents	can	approximate	towards,	although	we	can	never	realize	them	perfectly. The	view	outlined in this section is	developed in	greater	depth	and	detail elsewhere	(Smithies	2019).	My	main	aim	here	is	just	to	explain	how	this	view	solves our	puzzle	by	precluding	conflicts	between	evidence	and	coherence.	The	challenge that	remains	is	to	explain	away	the	intuitions	about	cases	that	generate	the	puzzle in	the	first	place.	I'll	address	this	challenge	by	invoking	a	distinction	between	ideal and	non-ideal	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality. 5. Ideal	and	Non-Ideal	Rationality As	we	saw	in	§1,	Worsnip's	(2018a)	argument	for	bifurcationism	assumes	that	you can have	misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence supports. For	example,	Miss	Marple's	expert	testimony	gives	Mabel	misleading	higher-order evidence that her evidence incriminates the vicar. I deny this assumption. You cannot	have	misleading	higher-order	evidence	about	what	your	evidence	supports because	these	facts	are	always	certain	given	your	evidence. We	need	to	rethink	the	assumption	that	you	have	evidence	for	a	conclusion whenever	someone	credible	tells	you	that	it's	true.	What	your	evidence	supports	is a	matter	that	depends	not	only	on	substantive	facts	about	what	evidence	you	have, but also on structural facts about the evidential support relation that apply to everyone.	The	structural	constraints	on	the	evidential support relation	guarantee that	your	evidence	cannot	be	misleading	about	logic	and	evidence.	All	contingent truths	about	your	evidence	are	self-evident	in	the	sense	that	they	make	themselves certain. Moreover, all necessary truths about logic and evidential support are certain given any	possible body	of evidence.	This	means, ironically enough, that when	you	receive	misleading	testimony	that	not-p,	your	evidence	makes	it	certain that	p,	when	this	is	a	truth	about	logic	or	evidence. Much	of	the	resistance	to	this	proposal	stems	from	the	following	argument, although	it	is	often	left	implicit: (1) Epistemic rationality always requires that you proportion your beliefs to your	evidence. (2) When you receive	misleading testimony, epistemic rationality sometimes requires	that	you	are	uncertain	or	mistaken	about	logic	and	evidence. (3) Therefore,	misleading	testimony	sometimes	provides	you	with	uncertain	or misleading	evidence	about	logic	and	evidence. As I'll explain, however, this argument trades on an equivocation between ideal and non-ideal standards of epistemic rationality. By ideal standards, epistemic rationality	always	requires	proportioning	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence.	Since	your 21 evidence	is	never	misleading	about	logic	and	evidence,	however,	it	is	never	ideally rational to be uncertain about logic or evidence.	On this reading, premise (1) is true but premise (2) is false. By non-ideal standards, in contrast, epistemic rationality sometimes requires being uncertain or mistaken about logic and evidence.	But	this	is	because	non-ideal	rationality	requires	responding	to	evidence about your cognitive limitations by adopting strategies that diverge from the epistemic ideal of respecting your evidence.	On this reading, premise (2) is true but	premise (1) is false.	The	argument is	unsound	because there is	no	consistent interpretation	on	which	both	premises	are	true. Here is a simple example to illustrate the distinction between ideal and non-ideal standards of epistemic rationality. Suppose Holmes and Watson are working on a murder case and share all their evidence. The evidence is complicated	enough	that	it's	not	obvious	which	conclusion	it	supports,	but	in	fact it	incriminates	the	butler.	Since	Holmes	is	an	expert	detective,	he	knows	that	the butler	is	guilty,	although	he	keeps	his	opinion	private.	Meanwhile,	Watson	doesn't know	what	to	make	of	the	evidence,	since	this	is	not	his	field	of	expertise. What should	Watson	believe?	There is no single answer to this question. Deontic	terms	are	highly	context-sensitive	and	we	get	different	answers	depending on	how	we	interpret	them.	One	dimension	of	this	context-sensitivity	concerns	the distinction	between	more	and	less	demanding	normative	standards. In	one	sense,	Watson	should	believe	what	Holmes	believes,	since	this	is	the conclusion	that	is	supported	by	his	evidence.	Although	Holmes	and	Watson	differ in their response to their evidence, there is	no	difference in	what their evidence supports.	After	all,	they	have	exactly	the	same	evidence.	Moreover,	there	can	be	no difference in what this shared body of evidence supports, since the evidential support	relation	applies	to	everyone	in	the	same	impersonal	way.	Hence,	Watson should	believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely,	that	the	butler	is	guilty. In another sense, however,	Watson should remain agnostic. After all, he knows	that	–	unlike	Holmes	–	he	lacks	the	expertise	to	follow	the	evidence	where it	leads.	If	he	gets	lucky	in	this	case,	he	is	prone	to	go	awry	elsewhere,	since	he	is not reliably responsive to the facts or the evidence in hard cases. So, even if he forms	a	true	belief	that	is	supported	by	his	evidence,	he	is	not	reliable	enough	to acquire knowledge or justified belief. Moreover, Watson has enough evidence about his own cognitive limitations to know all this. Since he knows he cannot acquire	knowledge	or	justified	belief,	it	doesn't	make	sense	for	him	to	try.	Instead, it	makes	sense	to	adopt	a	more	cautious	policy	that takes	his	evidence	about	his cognitive	limitations	into	account.	Hence,	Watson	should	remain	agnostic,	rather than	forming	any	opinion	about	the	case. These two answers reflect the distinction between ideal and non-ideal standards	of	epistemic	rationality. Ideal standards	of	epistemic	rationality	always require	respecting	your	evidence,	whereas	non-ideal	standards	sometimes	require responding to evidence about your cognitive limitations by adopting strategies that	diverge	from	the	epistemic	ideal.	Our	intuitive	judgments	about	what	people 22 "should" believe don't always track	what their evidence supports, since they are often	more	sensitive	to	non-ideal	standards	of	epistemic	rationality. Someone might protest that Holmes and Watson don't share the same evidence,	since	they	have	different	evidence	about	their	own	expertise.	This	is	true, of	course,	but	it	doesn't	mean	they	have	different	evidence	about	the	murder	case. The	higher-order	evidence	doesn't	change	the	evidential	probability	that	the	butler is guilty. The evidential probability of a hypothesis depends on how well the hypothesis	explains	all	the	evidence.	This	is	an	objective,	a	priori	matter	that	is	not affected by evidence about your own capacity for reasoning. The evidential probability	of	a	hypothesis	isn't	affected	by	the	realization	that	you're	too	tired	or distracted to reason clearly. This distorts the epistemic function of higher-order evidence	about	your	cognitive	limitations	(Christensen	2010:	203-4). I	propose	an	alternative	account	of the	epistemic function	of	higher-order evidence	(cf.	Smithies	2019:	Ch.	10;	forthcoming).	Rather	than	changing	what	your evidence	supports,	it	changes	which	response	to	your	evidence	is	required	by	nonideal standards of epistemic rationality. When you have higher-order evidence about your cognitive limitations, it makes sense to adopt epistemic policies to manage	them.	For	example,	it	makes	sense	for	Watson	to	remain	agnostic,	rather than	forming	an	opinion	about	the	case,	since	he	knows	he	cannot	reliably	follow the evidence where it leads. It doesn't follow that his evidence supports agnosticism.	This	is	simply	the	best	epistemic	policy	for	managing	what	he	knows about	his	on	cognitive	limitations. We can make this proposal more precise by locating it within the framework of rule consequentialism, which evaluates rules by their expected consequences.	We	can	evaluate rules in	a	way that is sensitive to the	distinction between following	a rule	and	merely trying to follow	a	rule.	Following	a	rule is	a kind	of	achievement:	merely	trying	to	the	follow	the	rule	does	not	guarantee	that you will succeed. When you have evidence that you might fail, the expected consequences of trying to follow a rule can diverge from the expected consequences of following the rule. In such cases, the best rule to follow is not always	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow	(cf.	Lasonen-Aarnio	2010;	Schoenfield	2015). When we evaluate rules for epistemic rationality, we're concerned solely with	their	expected	consequences	for	how	well	you	succeed	in	proportioning	your beliefs	to	your	evidence.	From	an	evidentialist	perspective,	the	best	rule	to	follow is the evidentialist rule, "Always proportion your beliefs to your evidence!" However,	this	is	not	always	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow	when	you	have	evidence that	you	are	likely	to	fail.	It	is	counterproductive	to	try	to	follow	the	evidentialist rule	when	this	is	likely	to	make	you	less	responsive	to	your	evidence.	In	such	cases, there	may	be	greater	expected	value	in	trying	to	follow	some	alternative	strategy. By	ideal	standards,	epistemic	rationality	always	requires	following	the	evidentialist rule, since this is the best rule to follow. By non-ideal standards, however, epistemic rationality sometimes requires following a non-evidentialist rule	when this	is	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow. 23 Now let's apply this distinction to our example. By ideal standards of epistemic	rationality,	Watson	should	believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely, that the butler is guilty and that his evidence supports this conclusion.	And yet Watson	is	a	non-ideal	agent	who	is	always	capable	of	achieving	these	demanding epistemic standards. In hard cases, he is unable to follow his evidence	where it leads. Moreover, he has enough higher-order evidence about his own cognitive limitations	to	know	this	about	himself.	So	he	knows	that	it's	counterproductive	to try	to	respect	his	evidence	in	hard	cases,	since	the	expected	consequence	is	that	he will manifest grossly irrational dispositions. It makes more sense to adopt the cautious	epistemic	policy	of	remaining	agnostic	in	hard	cases,	although	he	knows in advance that this strategy	will diverge from the epistemic ideal.	Nevertheless, adopting	this	strategy	is	a	reasonable	response	to	his	higher-order	evidence	about his	cognitive	limitations. The key point is that our intuitions about what people "should" believe don't always track what their evidence supports. There is an intuitive sense in which	Watson should remain agnostic about the first-order	question	of	whether the	butler is	guilty	and the	higher-order	question	of	what	his	evidence	supports. However, it doesn't follow that his evidence supports agnosticism about either first-order	or	higher-order	questions.	It's	easy	to	overlook	this	point	unless	we	pay careful attention to the distinction between ideal and non-ideal standards of epistemic	rationality. 6. Epistemic	Dilemmas? Are there epistemic dilemmas in	which the requirements of ideal and	non-ideal rationality come into conflict? The whole point of distinguishing these requirements is that they can diverge, since ideal rationality always requires respecting your evidence, whereas non-ideal rationality sometimes requires disrespecting	your	evidence.	For	example,	Watson	is	required	by	ideal	standards	to believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely,	that	the	butler	is	guilty	–	although	he is required by non-ideal standards to remain agnostic. This is not an epistemic dilemma in the strict sense, however, since there is no univocal sense in	which Watson	ought	and	ought	not	to	believe	this	conclusion.	There's	one	sense	in	which he ought to believe it and another sense in which he ought to withhold belief. There	are	no	epistemic	dilemmas	in	which	you	ought	in	the	same	sense	to	pursue logically	incompatible	options. This bears comparison with Worsnip's (2018a) equivocation strategy for solving our puzzle. He avoids epistemic dilemmas by denying that there is any single	sense	in	which	you	ought	to	respect	your	evidence	and	to	remain	coherent. Unlike	Worsnip,	however,	I	reject	the	bifurcationist	assumption	that	your	evidence can	support	incoherent	beliefs.	On	my	unificationist	proposal,	there	is	no	conflict between evidence and coherence, or between substantive and structural requirements,	but	only	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	requirements.	Ideal	rationality always requires	both	coherence	and	respecting	your	evidence,	whereas	non-ideal 24 rationality sometimes requires violating these ideals. Let me close with some reasons	for	preferring	this	view. First, unificationism preserves the attractive idea that there is a unified virtue of epistemic rationality that incorporates both substantive and structural dimensions.	As	we	noted	at	the	outset,	epistemically	rational	thinkers	are	not	only coherent but also respect their evidence. On the unificationist view, this is no mere coincidence, since respecting your evidence guarantees coherence. The virtue	of	epistemic	rationality	is	to	hold	beliefs	that	cohere	with	substantive	facts about your evidence in accordance with structural facts about the evidential support relation.	According to	bifurcationism, in contrast, there are two	distinct virtues corresponding to the distinction between substantive and structural requirements,	but	there	is	nothing	that	unifies	them	in	a	single	virtue	of	epistemic rationality.	We	might	decide to call someone 'epistemically rational' only if they satisfy	both	kinds	of	requirements.	But	this	doesn't	pick	out	any	unified	virtue,	as opposed to a gerrymandered conjunction of distinct virtues. Decomposing epistemic	rationality	in	this	way	seems	like	a	theoretical	last	resort. Second, we do not compromise the unity of epistemic rationality by drawing	a	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	requirements.	On	the	version	of rule	consequentialism	outlined	in	§5,	non-ideal	rationality	is	a	matter	of	adopting strategies that have the greatest expected value	when evaluated by standards of ideal rationality. Hence, non-ideal rationality is explained in terms of its conduciveness towards ideal rationality. Ideal and non-ideal requirements of epistemic rationality	ultimately flow from	the	same	normative source.	According to bifurcationism, in contrast, substantive and structural requirements are two distinct	and	sui	generis	sources	of	normativity. Third,	unificationism	is	more	parsimonious.	Every	normative	theory	needs some	version	of the ideal/non-ideal	distinction	to	account for	cases in	which	the expected value of trying to follow its requirements diverges from the expected value	of	successfully	following	them.	In	such	cases,	there	is	an	ideal	sense	in	which you should follow its requirements, but there is a non-ideal sense in	which you should	do	otherwise	when	this	has	greater	expected	value.	Bifurcationism	doesn't obviate the need for this distinction: if we divorce substantive and structural requirements, then we need to distinguish further between ideal and non-ideal species	of	each	genus.	Hence,	unificationism	retains the	advantage	of theoretical parsimony.	We cannot simply trade the	distinction	between ideal and	non-ideal requirements	for	the	distinction	between	substantive	and	structural	requirements. These	distinctions	don't	do	the	same	kind	of	theoretical	work. Fourth, unificationism explains how there can be epistemic value in disrespecting	your	evidence.	As	we've	seen,	bifurcationism	struggles	to	explain	the value of coherence when it comes at the cost of respecting your evidence. In contrast, unificationism does a better job of explaining the value of non-ideal rationality	when	it	diverges	from	the	epistemic	ideal	of	respecting	your	evidence. There	is	value	in	non-ideal	rationality	because	it	maximizes	your	expected	degree of responsiveness to your evidence given your	higher-order evidence about your 25 cognitive	limitations.	Hence,	the	value	of	non-ideal	rationality	can	be	explained	in evidentialist	terms. Finally, unificationism explains our intuitions about cases with minimal mutilation	of	plausible	theoretical	principles.	We	can	explain	the	intuitive	sense	in which	Watson	should	remain	agnostic	about	the	murder,	despite	the	fact	that	his evidence	incriminates	the	butler.	This	intuition	tracks	a	non-ideal	requirement	of epistemic	rationality,	which	permits	Watson	to	respond	to	higher-order	evidence about	his own cognitive limitations	by adopting strategies that deviate from the epistemic	ideal.	At	the	same	time,	however,	we	can	retain	the	plausible	theoretical principle	that	epistemic	rationality	always	requires	respecting	your	evidence,	since evidentialism	is	true	of	the	ideal	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	In	this	way, the distinction between ideal and non-ideal rationality allows us to reconcile intuition	and	theory	without	making	recourse	to	bifurcationism. References Christensen, David. 2004. Putting Logic In Its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational	Belief.	Oxford	University	Press. Christensen,	David.	2007.	Does	Murphy's	Law	Apply	in	Epistemology?	Self-Doubt and	Rational	Ideals.	Oxford	Studies	in	Epistemology	2:	3-31. Christensen, David. 2010. Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological	Research	81.1:	185-215. Coates,	Allen.	2012.	"Rational	Epistemic	Akrasia."	American	Philosophical	Quarterly 49.2:	113-124. Elga, Adam. 2013. "The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection	Principle."	Philosophical	Studies	164.1:	127-139. Enoch, David. 2006. Agency, Schmagency:	Why	Normativity	Won't Come From What	is	Constitutive	of	Action.	Philosophical	Review	115.2:	169-198. Feldman,	Richard.	2003.	Epistemology.	Prentice	Hall. Horowitz,	Sophie.	2014.	Epistemic	Akrasia.	Nous	48.4:	718-44. Huemer, Michael. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Rowman and Littlefield. Hughes,	Nick.	2019.	Dilemmic	Epistemology.	Synthese	196.10:	4059-4090. Kiesewetter, Benjamin. 2017. The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford University Press. Kolodny,	Niko.	2005.	Why	Be	Rational?	Mind	114:	509-563. Kolodny,	Niko.	2007.	How	Does	Coherence	Matter?	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian Society	107:	229-263. Lasonen-Aarnio,	Maria.	2010.	Unreasonable	Knowledge.	Philosophical	Perspectives 24:	1-21 Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria. 2020. Enkrasia or Evidentialism? Learning to Love Mismatch.	Philosophical	Studies	177:	597-632. Leonard, Nick. 2020. Epistemic Dilemmas and Rational Indeterminacy. Philosophical	Studies	177:	573-596. Lord,	Errol.	2018.	The	Importance	of	Being	Rational.	Oxford	University	Press. 26 Sartre,	Jean-Paul.	1946.	Existentialism	is	a	Humanism.	Methuen. Scanlon,	T.	M.	1998.	What	We	Owe	To	Each	Other.	Harvard	University	Press. Scanlon,	T.	M.	2007.	Structural	Irrationality.	In	Common	Minds:	Themes	From	the Philosophy	of Philip	Pettit,	edited	by	Geoffrey	Brennan,	Robert	Goodin,	Frank Jackson,	and	Michael	Smith.	Oxford	University	Press. Schoenfield, Miriam. 2015. Bridging Rationality and Accuracy. Journal of Philosophy	112.12:	633-657. Schroeder,	Mark.	2008.	Having	Reasons.	Philosophical	Studies.	139:	57-71. Smithies, Declan. 2012. Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	85.2:	273-300. Smithies, Declan. 2019. The Epistemic Role of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. Smithies,	Declan,	Preston	Lennon,	and	Richard	Samuels.	Forthcoming. Irrational Minds.	Synthese. Titelbaum, Michael. 2015. Rationality's Fixed Point (Or: In Defense of Right Reason).	Oxford	Studies	in	Epistemology	5:	253-294. Weatherson,	Brian.	2019.	Normative	Externalism.	Oxford	University	Press. Wedgwood,	Ralph.	2017.	The	Value	of	Rationality.	Oxford	University	Press. Worsnip, Alex. 2018a. The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological	Research	96.1:	3-44. Worsnip,	Alex.	2018b.	What	Is	(In)Coherence?	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	13:	184206.